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THE "DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION"
EXCEPTION OF THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT: SOME REFLECTIONS ON
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
ROBERT C. VAUGHAN

INTRODUCTION
"Legal obligations that exist, but cannot be enforced, are
ghosts that are seen in the law but that are elusive to the grasp."'
Historically, the concept of sovereign immunity from suit has
given rise to several such views of governmental liability, or lack
of it, in tort. No matter what bases in theory have been assigned
to these views, their pervasiveness is readily apparent in AngloAmerican jurisprudence.
It was the intent of Congress in enacting the Federal Tort
Claims Act of 19462 to breathe the life of enforceability into some
of these "obligations" and thus remove a portion of the shroud of
metaphysics and theory which have covered them for centuries.
The Federal Tort Claims Act waived sovereign immunity from
suit for certain specified torts of federal employees. It provided for
relief for damages to property or personal injury or death "caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of
the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment. . . ."3 Among the exceptions provided for in §2680
1 Justice Holmes in The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922).
2 28 U.S.C. §§1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 26712680 (1952).
3 28 U.S.C. §1346(b):
. . . under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
Claims are assigned to the United States District Court for the district within which the plaintiff resides or within which the act or omission complained of took place. (§1402(b)).
Cases are to be tried without a jury. (§2404).
No ceiling is set upon the possible amount that may be claimed; but
punitive damages are not allowed. (§2674).
Any judgment obtained is a complete bar to any action against the
employee of the Government whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim. (§§2672, 2676).

are claims arising from acts or omissions in the execution of statutes
or regulations, and those which are based upon the exercise of a
"discretionary function." 4
Courts have shown by their interpretation and application of
this section, especially that part excepting the "discretionary function," that some of the most elusive of Justice Holmes' "ghostly"
legal obligations have been re-endowed with the phantasmal qualities that sometimes deny real injustice.
THE DECLINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
What has been called "the almost explosive growth"' 5 in recent
years of private tort law has been accompanied by a trend toward
spreading the burden of losses so that injured parties will not be
left without relief. The Federal Tort Claims Act and some recent
state developments have presented commensurate opportunities for
progress in the field of public tort liability. The prospectively
devastating consequences of such legislation to the firmly entrenched
theories of sovereign immunity are demonstrated by reference to
any basic textbook on United States history. Whether such consequences have actually come about is another matter.
Writers have found the most perplexing problem to be one
of ascertaining the reasons why such concepts as "sovereign immunity" and "the king can do no wrong" should have been
adopted in the United States, under a system of government where
there is no individual king-like sovereignty and where sovereignty
6
is thought to flow from the people.
428 U.S.C. §2860 reads: "The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to (a) Any claim based upon an
act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due
care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
5 Stason, Governmental Tort Liability Symposium, 29 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1321,
1323 (1954).
6 The legal periodical literature in the field of governmental tort liability
is voluminous, to say the least. Even before the passage of the Federal
Tort Claims Act in 1946, it was a favorite topic of the legal authors,
especially in regard to the philosophical bases of theories of sovereign
immunity. By far the most thorough historical and philosophical treatment, and one which had a great influence in the movement for legis-

For the most part, our courts have given lip service to
Borchard's view that the real basis of the statement that "the king
can do no wrong" is that the king (or the executive-administrative
branch as the exemplification of such sovereign power in the
United States) is not privileged to do wrong. 7 Thus, the "king"
in Anglo-American law can commit some acts which are against
the law, and for which the people might obtain redress. The
question then becomes one of removing the procedural impediments
to suit.8

But, underlying the reluctance of the courts to allow such
traditional concepts to be circumvented, there is a reliance on the
theory that the sovereign who has created the law is himself not
a part of it.9 This Hobbesian view of law as coercion, in respect

lation, is found in a series of six articles by Professor Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 and 36 Yale

L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1924-1927).

Also see generally Symposium on

Governmental Tort Liability 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 179 (1942);

Note, 25 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 872 (1950); Parker, The King Does No Wrong
-Liability for Misadministration 5 Vand.L.Rev. 167 (1952); Symposium on the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 Vand.L.Rev. 175 (1954);
Governmental Tort Liability Symposum, 29 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1321
(1954); James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 14 NACCA L.J. 226

and 15 NACCA L.J. 281 (1954-1955). See also Gellhorn and Schenck,
Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47 Colum.L.Rev. 722

(1947) ; where the financial instability of the early American states is
cited as a reason for our adoption of the English concepts of sovereign
immunity and "the king can do no wrong."
7Borchard, supra, note 6, 34 Yale L.J. at 2. But cf. Parker, supra note 6
(holding that the king's actions simply are not legal wrongs).
8 See Borchard, supra, note 6. The ability of Congress to pass a Court of
Claims Act (1885), and of the states to grant limited liability in some
instances other than tort claims, even in the 19th century, might be
ascribed to this view. The Supreme Court has many times granted mandamus in cases where ministerial acts were contested, based on the test
established in Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884). As to the
basis and use of private bills in Congress, see Gellhorn and Lauer,
Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U.L.Rev.

1325 (1954).
9 This has been referred to as the "secular" theory of sovereign immunity,
as distinguished from the "sacred" theory of "the king can do no
wrong". A third theory, that based on "expedience", would predicate
sovereign immunity upon the necessity of preventing the hampering of
government operations and the threat thereby to public welfare. Note,
25 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 872 (1950).

to the sovereign's position as being above the law, found one of its
strongest advocates in Justice Holmes."
As in other areas, the views of Holmes here seem to have been
more influential than some in the majority would like to admit.
And yet, for one who advocates a conceptual view of law as
experience rather than as strict logic," it is curious that Holmes
should espouse a theory which, although nicely logical, is totally
at odds with some of our most fundamental concepts of individual
12
rights, and contrary to our experience in political freedom.
To subscribe to the view that the state as the creator of the
law is not able to commit a tort seems to endow the phrase
"sovereign immunity" with a broader meaning than was first
assumed. If the sovereign is considered to be the law, let alone to
be above the law, it becomes apparent that what was professed
to be a procedural impediment to suit for torts is more nearly
a lack of substantive liability.
In this light the question becomes one of deciding whether
the Federal Tort Claims Act, especially in regard to the "discretionary-function" exception, makes any substantive revisions in the
theories of governmental tort liability, or whether, by removing the
impediments to suit in some cases, it does not change many of the
historical concepts of sovereign immunity.
THE DALEHITE CASE-THE GRAVEYARD REVISITED
The relatively few years since the passage of the Federal Tort
Claims Act have seen a marked increase in the use of the "discretionary-function" exception as a defense by the Government. Prior
to 1953, the various Federal courts wrestled mightily with the
problem of where to draw the line between those acts which
involve discretion and planning, and those which are merely on
the operational level. The conclusion became inescapable that there
is an unbroken scale along which acts of government employees
20

"A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception
or absolute theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends." Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349,

353 (1907).
11 Holmes, The Common Law (1881).
12 See Borchard, supra note 6, especially 36 Yale L.J. at 17-41, 757-807.

could be differentiated only as a matter of degree insofar as
"discretion" is concerned. In attempting to determine which was
the proper test of "discretionary function," each court tended to
over-emphasize one consideration to the exclusion of the others.' 3
On the whole, the surest trend to be inferred from the decisions
prior to 1953 was that the "governmental-proprietary" distinction
was not a part of the Federal Tort Claims Act and could not serve
as a measure of the "discretionary function."' 4
In Dalehite v. United States,'5 which was a test case for the
more than 300 claims, representing over $200,000,000, arising
from the Texas City disaster of 1947, the Supreme Court in 1953
arrived at a result which implied a revival of the "governmentalproprietary" test and broadened the area of sovereign immunity.
The plaintiffs claimed negligence, substantially on the part of
the entire body of Federal officials and employees involved in a
program of production of the fertilizer material in which the
original fire occurred and which exploded. This fertilizer had been
produced and distributed at the instance, according to the specifications and under the control of the United States Government.
13 Note,

'2

3.

66 Harv. L.Rev. 488, 498 (1953). The note discusses some of the
factors employed in judicial application of the Act: (1) the language
of the statute under which the official acts; (2) the type of discretion;
(3) the position of the employee; (4) possible repercussions of the
activity; (5) "discretionary function as defined in other contexts; (6)
the presence of a "governmental" function.
See Note, 5 .Stan. L.Rev. 274, 282 (1951). And see Somerset Seafood Co.
v. United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951); Cerri v. United
States, 80 F.Supp. 831, 833 (D.C.N.D.Cal. 1948). But cf. Toledo v.
United States, 95 F.Supp. 838 (D. Puerto Rico 1951) (where it was
said that "governmental function" is an additional test of and limitation
on government liability under the Act)
Such difficulty in interpretation seems to stem from an unjustified
extension to the national level of the judicial distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" activities which has long been applied in
the area of municipal corporations. But a municipal corporation is not
generally regarded as possessing sovereignty; it is a creature of the state
legislature. Therefore, the "discretionary-ministerial" test which was
evolved in the municipal field to "substitute a rule of reasonableness"
in the "proprietary" aspect of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction, would seem to have no relevance in considering federal and state
liability. See Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Comparative Survey, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 181
(1942); Borchard, supra note 6, especially 34 Yale L.J. 129-143, 229258; Petersen, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26
Minn. L.Rev. 293, 338 (1942).
346 U. S. 15 (1953).

The Court applied the "discretionary-function" exception of
§2680 (a) to deny recovery. In a four-to-three decision (two
justices not participating) the Court held to be "discretionary"
not only the high-level policy decision to use ammonium nitrate
for fertilizer and to ship it abroad for agricultural rehabilitation
after the war, but also the decisions (a) to refrain from further
experimentation designed to discover the extent of its dangerously
explosive character, and (b) to use a certain type of container,
bag it at a certain temperature, and have it put out without any
warning of possible dangers. 6 The planning level was thus extended to cover all the decisions made by lower officials under
the program, and to cloak them with sovereign immunity as being
"discretionary" in nature.
Some observers have suggested that the real importance of
Dalehite rested in its rejection of the plaintiffs claim that the
Government was liable without fault as a manufacturer of an
ultra-hazardous commodity.' 1 But more important in its possible
implications and its inhibiting effects on the lower courts was the
extension of the "discretionary-function" exception to a point where
it appeared to embrace every act of a government employee other
than the most rigorously routine. Almost all human conduct involves the use of some judgment and discretion. If the term "discretionary function" is to be construed to refer to any conscious
decision, the Government would not incur liability for any act of
negligence other than inadvertence.' s
16

17

1s

Ibid at 35-36. " ... [discretion includes] ... more than the initiation of
programs and activities . .. Where there is room for policy judgment
and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that the act of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance
with official directions cannot be actionable."
Heuser, Dalehite v. United States: A New Approach to the Federal Tort
Claims Act?, 7 Vand. L.Rev. 175 (1954).
Another factor in the case was the Court's rationalization that negligence of the Coast Guard in fighting a shipboard fire is not actionable
because there is no analogous liability in general tort law. ("An alleged
failure or carelessness of public firemen does not create actionable
rights." 346 U.S. at 43.)
But cf. Note, 101 Penn. L.Rev. 420 (1953), where it is suggested
that perhaps Dalehite was decided in larger reliance on the first clause
of §2680(a) relating to an "authorized activity" by the "discretionaryfunction" exception. (Relying on H.R.Rep. No. 1287, 79th Congress,
1st Sess., 5-6 (1942).
See Aron, Federal Tort Claims Act: Some Comments and Questions for
PractisingLawyers, 33 A.B.A.J. 226,227 (1947), where are set down

Many people along the line in the Texas City case made
decisions in the execution of the Government's program. The
Court concluded that all the relevant decisions were on the "discretionary" level and precluded government liability. If we examine
the language of the Act,' 9 we are forced to the conclusion that
the Supreme Court failed in the application of "discretionary" tests
in Dalehite. One need only to look at the case decisions and trends
in manufacturers' liability today to see that the judgments made by
the Government employees in carrying out the fertilizer program
were the kind for which a private producer would be held liable,
2
if they were negligently made.

0

The Court's decision in Dalehite casts some doubt on the
21
adequacy and accuracy of its earlier summation, in the Feres case,
of the effect of the Act in the area of governmental immunity.
certain comments of the Senate Committee reporting the bill: "'With
the expansion of government activities in recent years, it becomes increasingly important to grant private individuals the right to sue the
Government in respect to such torts as negligence in the operation of
vehicles.'"
But,

"

.

.

. surely a statute so long debated was meant to embrace

more than traffic accidents. If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine
that 'the King can do no wrong' has not been uprooted, it has merely
been amended to read, 'the King can do only little wrongs'." Justice
Jackson, dissenting in Dalehite, 346 U. S. at 60.
As a result of Dalehite, it was suggested, not altogether facetiously,
that a more accurate title for the Federal Tort Claims Act would be
"The Federal Negligence Operation of Motor Vehicles Ace'. Gellhorn
and Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29

N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1325 (1954).
'9

28 U.S.C. §2674: "The United States shall be liable . . . in the same

manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances... "
The difficulty that arises under this provision stems from attempts to
interpret the phrase, "under like circumstances". The Supreme Court,
in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), interpreted "like circumstances" to mean "all the circumstances", and denied recovery for
the death of a serviceman injured through the alleged negligence of his
superior officers. The Court pointed out the "distinctly federal" character of the relationship existing between the wronged and the wrongdoer. 340 U.S. at 143-144.
20 See James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 15 NACCA L.J. 281, 293

(1955); Note, 25 Fordham L.Rev. 167 (1956) (where it is suggested
that the amount of claims had much to do with the end result in
Dalehite).
21 Supra, note 19 at 141. "It will be seen that ...

[the act] ...

is not the

creation of new causes of action, but acceptance of liability under circumstances that would bring private liability into existence."

It appears that ramifications of the holding in the Dalehite case
strike much deeper into the heart of the problem of sovereign
immunity than mere considerations of "ministerial-discretionary"
tests in the realm of the "governmental-proprietary" distinction. It
becomes apparent that the broadening of the base of government
liability in tort called for in the Federal Tort Claims Act was
not as extensive as some had first thought. The "ghostly" legal
obligations of Justice Holmes were drained of the life-blood seemingly introduced by Congress and returned to their ethereal state.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE DALEHITE
Whatever progress had been previously noted in the lower
Federal courts toward broadening the area of governmental liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act was halted abruptly, at least
for a while, by the Dalehite decision. The courts tended to follow
the lead of Dalehite in increasing the coverage afforded by the
22
"discretionary-function" exception.
It remained for the Supreme Court itself to make the first
notable departure from the trends inplicit in the Dalehite case,
by allowing recovery to the claimant in Indian Towing Co. v.
23
United States.
The Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that where the
United States undertakes to supply lighthouse service it must
exercise reasonable care, and its failure to do so will subject it to
liability under the Act; the operation of a lighthouse is an activity
for which a private individual under similar circumstances could
incur liability in tort within the meaning of the statute. It was felt
that the failure of the subordinates to act and to give warning to
others of a known dangerous condition was a breach of a duty
owed to others.
Since the agents in charge of the manufacture and shipment
of the fertilizer in the Dalehite case were under no less an obligation, the decision in the Indian Towing Co. case seemed to be a
fairer interpretation of the extent of the "discretionary-function"
22 See National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Gir. 1954);
Goodwill Industries v. United States, 218 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1954).
23350 U. S. 61 (1955).

exception. 24 The Court here further departed from the approach
taken by the Court in the Feres and Dalehite cases; it pointed out
that Congress did not intend the Act to be self-defeating by
adopting the specious distinction found in the "governmental vs.
proprietary quagmire that has long plagued the law of municipal
25
corporations.,
Cases since the Indian Towing Co. decision have followed its
lead in refusing to apply the "governmental-proprietary" distinction
and thereby further broaden the exception afforded by §2680(a) .26
In Rayonier v. United States, 27 the Supreme Court (Justices Reed
and Clark dissenting) recently departed to an even greater extent
from the rationale apparent in Dalehite. In Rayonier, negligence
was charged to the United States Forest Service for failure to
guard against or properly fight forest fires ignited on Government
land in the State of Washington. Both the district court and the
28
court of appeals relied upon Dalehite in dismissing the claims.
Justice Black's majority opinion places liability on the United
States if, as was alleged in the complaints, state law would enforce
liability on private persons or corporations under similar circumstances. Rejected is the contention of the Government that the
Tort Claims Act only imposes liability on the United States under
circumstances where governmental bodies have traditionally been
responsible for the misconduct of their employees. That private
persons do not customarily carry on the negligently performed
work is not to be the decisive factor.
Thus, the Court now finds that liability ". . . in the same

manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
See Notes, 34 Texas L.Rev. 956 (1956), 25 Fordham L.Rev. 167 (1956)
("the duty to act is inconsistent with the choice of whether to act or
not to act, possibly even at the executive level, and once that duty is
found the "discretionary" exemption disappears"), 9 Vand. L. Rev. 882
(1956) ("the real test: not whether private persons actually engage in
such activity, but whether they could conceivably do so").
25 350 U.S. at 65.
26 See Pierce v. United States, 142 F.Supp. 721 (D.C.E.D. Tenn. 1955);
Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1956) ; Bulloch v. United
States, 145 F.Supp. 824 (D.C.D. Utah 1956). But cf. Taylor v. United
States, 236 F.2nd 649 (6th Cir. 1956); Dugan v. United States, 147
F.Supp. 674 (D.C.Dist. of Col. 1956).
27 352, U. S., 1.
28 225 F.2d 642 and 225 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1956).
24

13

circumstances . . .,,21 depends upon state law in each instance,
rather than upon an extension of any sort of a "governmentalproprietary" distinction.
Changes in the personnel of the Court perhaps hastened this
retrenchment from the broad exception imposed by Dalehite. However, that even this later Court was willing only to reject the
uniquely-governmental test, and is not yet disposed to retreat from
a widespread application of the "discretionary-function" exception,
may be seen from dictum in Soriano v. United States,30 a case
arising in the Court of Claims, and decided by the same nine
justices who participated in the Rayonier decision two weeks later.
A change in personnel on the Court does not mean any substantial
weakening of a philosophy so well-established as our concept of
sovereign immunity.
In short, Dalehite has become tempered in its implications and
largely discredited by the present Court, at least insofar as Dalehite
broadened the exceptions under the Act to preclude liability for
uniquely governmental activities. The "discretionary" problem remains.
CONCLUSION-IS THE "DECLINE" ASSURED?
At first glance, the case law on the "discretionary-function"
exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act merely exemplifies
the difficulty in deciding when any given exercise of judgment is
simply an execution of another official's decision, or is, in itself,
a primary decision which is acted upon by others.
The problem presented, however, is not that simple. That it
is more subtle and reaches deeper into our basic concepts of the
state and its relationships with its subjects is illustrated by the
tortuous and confused meanderings ifito the area of "governmentalproprietary" and "ministerial-discretionary" distinctions apparent
in so many of the judicial utterances on the subject. It is submitted
that changing the wording of §2680(a) and arriving at some sort
29

28 U.S.C. §2674.
U.S ..... 1 L.Ed.2d 306 at 311, 77 S.Ct. 269 at 273 (1957). Where
it is stated: "And this Court has long decided that limitations and conditions upon which the Government consents to be sued must be strictly
observed and exceptions thereto are not to be implied. United States
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590-591 (1941) and cases there cited."

30 352

of a definition of the "discretionary function" is not going to solve
the problem. What is needed is a thorough-going re-examination
of the doctrine that "the King can do no wrong." 31 For the fact
remains that when the King really acts as a king, he still commits
32
no wrong.
It is fairly easy to postulate that liability should not extend to
the consequences of a legislative or executive decision of a political
nature, and that the propriety of such decisions should not be
subject to judicial review.33 "It is not a tort for government to
govern."' 3 ' The important fact is that the extensions of this immunity are so pervasive in our concepts of sovereignty that even
if there were no express exceptions in the statute, our courts would
not hold the government liable for the consequences of many of
these disputed non-political decisions, despite the provisions of
§1346(b). 3 5
The solution to the problem will not be found by attempting
to fit the language of §2680(a), in regard to "discretion," into
previous patterns of precedent. 36 It rests rather in the realization
that the courts of the United States have never expressly repudiated
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The legal anachronism of "the
King can do no wrong," remains, as Professor Borchard pointed
out over thirty years ago, to haunt us with the weight of a legal
maxim.
It is a curious anomaly that, in a country which prides itself
in having a government "by the consent of the governed," we
should be bound by a doctrine that has its roots in Hobbesian
theories of "law as coercion." In other areas, the judicial inability,
31 Contra, Langford

v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 343 (1884) ("neither
in the United States or the states has the maxim that 'the King can do
no wrong' had any reference to our government.")
32 Some observers prior to Dalehite were able to see the difficulties inherent
in the "discretionary-function" exception of §2680(a). See Parker, The
King Does No Wrong-Liability for Misadministration,5 Vand.L.Rev.
167, 176 (1952) " . . . [the Act] . . . bows to the idea that both the

King and his henchmen do no wrong."
33 See James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 15 NACCA L.J. 281, 290

(1955).
34 Justice Jackson, dissenting in Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 57.
35 See Note 3 supra.
36 But cf. James, supra, Note 33 at 290; Notes, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 488, 495-

496 (1953); 45 Ill.L.Rev. 791 (1951).

or rather unwillingness, to change a long-established doctrine is
certainly not without outstanding exceptions in our modem judicial
history. The fear of abandoning the doctrine of sovereign immunity
may perhaps be attributed to the historical and constitutionally
grounded aversion to judicial "legislation." Nevertheless, the judge
made law of Holmes and others, accepting the philosophical theories
of Hobbes and his contemporaries, is out of step with modem
political thought and contemporary public opinionY
Whether we can go as far as the French system in rejecting
the notion of sovereign immunity and make the State liable for
all service-connected faults, holding the government liable for the
consequences of non-feasance and late-feasance as well as misfeasance, is extremely doubtful.38 It has been felt that such a
scientific and just system of responsibility cannot be established by
judicial action in England and the United States, where the
doctrine of stare decisis exists."
Whether the solution is thus assumed to be one where a
constitutional amendment is necessary is also highly debatable.
Suffice to say, legislative action which endeavors to solve the
problem by removing the procedural impediments to suit, and then
by the wording and obvious intent of its exceptions, recognizes
that the concept of soveign immunity is so ensconced in a position
of honor in our traditions as to preclude substantive liability, serves
only to perpetuate the anachronism decried by Borchard.
It is frequently maintained that although precedent has its
place, society is entitled to progress. If the two claims conflict, either
the courts or the legislature must, as the situation demands, accept
the challenge and make a decision. The very nature of the origin
and procreation of the theories advanced to justify "sovereign
immunity" suggests that greater flexibility, at least on the appellate
level, will result in the only complete and lasting solution. As Justice
Cardozo once said, jurisprudence itself "will be the gainer in the
87 See Schwartz,, Public Tort Liability in France, 29 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1432,
1439-1461 (1954).
38 Ibid. See Schwartz, supra, note 37; Jacoby, Federal Tort Claims Act and
French Law of Governmental Liability, 7 Vand.L.Rev. 246 (1954);
Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A
Comparative Survey, 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 181-213 (1942).
39 Blachly and Oatman, supra, note 38 at 213.

16

long run by fanning the fires of mental insurrection instead of
40
smothering them with platitudes.1
Lacking a definite rejection of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity for the torts of inferior officers and employees, we will
find that when cases like Dalehite occur (and occur again they
will) the life seemingly imparted to these elusive legal obligations
by such as the Federal Tort Claims Act is merely transitory. Absent
a basic revision in our concepts of governmental liability, these
obligations will revert to the "ghostly" status imputed to them by
Holmes. They will remain as a mockery of progress in a modem
democracy and, in fact, of the primary end of government: "the
41
protection of the persons and property of men."1

40 Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science (1928), page 3.
41 Borchard, supra, note 6 at 34 Yale L.J. 2 (quoting Lord Macauley).

